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CASES NOTED
BANKRUPTCY
ASSIGNMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATES - PROPERTY CAPABLE OF
TRANSFER - Reichert v. General Ins. Co., 69 Cal. Rptr. 321, 442 P.2d 377
(1968).- After a fire in the plaintiff's motel, his insurance company
refused to reimburse him for his loss. Plaintiff was forced into bankruptcy
and later brought suit for damages. Construing section 70 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1964), the California Supreme Court held that
the right of an insured to bring suit against his insurer for failure to comply
with the fire insurance contract passed to his trustee in bankruptcy, and con-
sequently could not later be asserted by the bankrupt.
This decision affirms the general principle that rights of action based on
contract and property, including rights of action, which could have
been transferred or assigned prior to bankruptcy, pass to the trustee. The
court here found that the cause of action arose prior to bankruptcy at the
time of the breach of contract. The dissent argued that the cause of action
arose at the time of bankruptcy rather than at the time of breach.
COMMERCE
POWER TO REGULATE - POLLUTION - United States v. Bishop Processing
Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968).- The Attorney General of the
United States brought suit against the Bishop Processing Company for
alleged violation of the Air Quality Act of 1967 (Clean Air Act), 42 U.S.C.
A. § 1857 (Supp. 1968). The court held that the Clean Air Act constituted
a valid exercise of congressional power within the scope of the commerce
clause since movement of pollutants across state lines both qualified as inter-
state commerce and had a substantial affect on it. The decision affirms past
constitutional construction that commerce power may be exercised to achieve
socially desirable objectives, although economic considerations may be ab-
sent.
CRIMINAL LAW
COMPELLING ACCUSED TO. INCRIMINATE HIMSELF - ADMISSIBILITY OF
EVIDENCE - City of Piqua v. Hinger, 15 Ohio St. 2d 110, 238 N.E.2d 766
(1968).- Defendant was convicted of driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, a misdemeanor. He appealed on the ground that motion
pictures made of his performance of various physical tests such as writing
his name and address and picking up a coin were taken prior to his being
apprised of his constitutional rights. The appellate court reversed. In
restoring the judgment of the trial court and reversing the appellate court,
the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the admission into evidence of such
tests and film did not violate the protection afforded testimonial and com-
municative acts under the fifth amendment, since they constituted "real or
physical evidence."
In narrowing the scope of testimonial and communicative acts and
widening that of real or physical evidence, this decision may signal the
necessity for a new category for motion pictures, which do not conveniently
fit into either group.
PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS - CHRONIC ALCOHOLISM AS A DEFENSE - Powell
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v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).- Appellant appealed from a conviction of
public drunkenness. A psychiatrist testified that appellant was a chronic
alcoholic, who had a compulsion to drink and who could not control his
behavior once a state of intoxication was reached. In affirming the convic-
tion, the Supreme Court held that criminally punishing acts committed
because of a compulsion symptomatic of a disease did not violate the cruel
and unusual punishment clause.
Appellant was unable to successfully compare his case with Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), where it was held cruel and unusual punish-
ment to criminally penalize the status of drug addiction. The Court dis-
tinguished Robinson as encompassing only cases where no actus reus had
occurred and not encompassing merely involuntarily acts. The Court thus
affirmed the prevailing view that appearances in public by a chronic alco-
holic constitute guilty acts.
DIVORCE
MODIFICATION OF ORDER - REDUCTION OF SUPPORT - Peters v. Peters, 14
Ohio St. 2d 268, 237 N.E.2d 902 (1968).- Plaintiff and defendant were
divorced by decree which incorporated a separation agreement that gave cus-
tody of their minor children to the plaintiff mother with defendant father
agreeing to pay for their support. The decree contained no language reserv-
ing to the court jurisdiction over the amount of support to be paid. Defend-
ant subsequently filed a motion to reduce this amount. The court of appeals
affirmed the denial of the motion and relied on Tullis v. Tullis, 138 Ohio
St. 187, 34 N.E.2d 212 (1941), stating that the trial court's failure to retain
jurisdiction over the amount of support precluded it from reducing the
amount. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court's juris-
diction with respect to the support of minor children continues, notwith-
standing the absence of any express reservation in the divorce decree or the
amount of support specified.
In so ruling the court specifically overruled Tullis and reaffirmed the
position that in determining the amount to be paid for the support of minor
children, the figure may be subsequently revised upward or downward by
the trial court, as the children s welfare dictates.
INSURANCE
PROXIMATE CAUSE - Fn Loss - Frontis v. Milwaukee Ins. Co.,
Conn .... , 242 A.2d 749 (1968).- Plaintiff, owner of a four story
commercial building bounded by a common party wall, was ordered to
remove the top two stories by the city building inspector. The inspector's
order was precipitated by a fire which destroyed the top three stories of the
adjoining building, rendering the party wall incapable of supporting the
lateral thrust of plaintiff's third and fourth stories. Plaintiff removed the
top two stories, placed a roof on the second story and claimed damages
under his fire insurance policy.
The Connecticut Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court's decision
for the plaintiff, rejected the insurer's contention that the building inspector
was the direct cause of the plaintiff's loss and, consequently, held that the
civil authority exclusion clause should apply. The court noted that the fire,
and not the building inspector, caused the weakness in the party wall. The
inspector's function was that of expert recognition of danger to the public
safety. This Connecticut Supreme Court decision is an extension of the
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prevailing trend of interpreting ambiguous insurance policy clauses in favor
of the insured.
INTERNAL REVENUE
DEDUCTIONS AND EXEMPTIONS - EMPLOYEE PLANS - Ed and Jim Fleitz,
Inc., 50 T.C. No. 35 (May 26, 1968).- Taxpayer corporation instituted a
profit sharing plan limited to its three salaried employees. The deduction
by the corporation of its contributions to the plan were disallowed by the
Commissioner. In a suit contesting the Commissioner's action, the Tax
Court held that corporate contributions to a "salaried only" profit sharing
plan were not deductible where the plan discriminated in favor of officers,
stockholders, and salaried employees. This decision affirmed the Commis-
sioner's prior position that in order for corporate contributions to a profit
sharing plan to qualify as a deductible business expense, the plan must either
cover a specified minimum percentage of all employees or must not be dis-
criminatory in operation in favor of officers, shareholders, supervisors, or
highly paid employees.
DEPRECIATION - INTANGIBLE PROPERTY - Alfred H. Thorns, 50 T.C. No.
24 (June 6, 1968).- Petitioner purchased a going casualty insurance busi-
ness, including goodwill and the lists of expired policyholders, for $10,500.
He attempted to amortize this amount over a 14-month period by means of
depreciation deductions, on the theory that the entire $10,500 could be
attributed to the expiration lists - these lists being treated as capital assets
as well as intangible property. The deduction was denied on the ground
that petitioner was unable to sustain the burden of proving that the lists
were not an integral part of the goodwill and that they had a definite useful
life.
The case affirms the general rule that, in the absence of special circum-
stances, if a definite amount of the purchase price is not allocated to
goodwill, no depreciation deduction will be allowed where the asset has no
readily ascertainable useful life.
LABOR RELATIONS
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES - PICKETING OF GATES RESERVED FOR NEUTRAL
PARTIES - Nashville Building and Construction Trades Council, 172 N.L.
R.B. No. 105 (1968).- As general contractor, the charging party entered
into a contract with both union and nonunion subcontractors to erect a shop-
ping center. The respondent union protested the hiring of nonunion sub-
contractors and picketed the job site. The general contractor reserved two
entrances to the shopping center: one for the "neutral" or union subcon-
tractors and one for the nonunion subcontractors. The National Labor
Relations Board found that the respondent violated section 158(b) (4) (B)
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964), by picket-
ing the gate reserved for the "neutral" or union subcontractors.
In reversing the trial examiner, the Board reaffirmed the policy estab-
lished in the Moore Dry Dock case, 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950), and prohibited
pickets from arbitrarily interferring with the activities of neutral parties.
LIBEL AND SLANDER
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS - STATEMENT OF COUNSEL - Theiss v. Scherer,
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396 F.2d 647 (6th Cir. 1968).- Defendant-attorney sent a letter directly
to plaintiff's attorney concerning the administration of an estate. In the letter
he allegedly made libelous statements imputing degrading motives to the
plaintiff who was contesting the will. In addition, copies of the letter
were sent by the defendant to other parties having a financial interest in the
probate action. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision
that such material was absolutely privileged since the letter was written in
reference to impending litigation, and sent exclusively to parties having a
direct financial interest in the outcome of the contest.
The holding in this case is in accord with decisions of other circuit
courts seeking to give an attorney freedom to conduct litigation without fear
of unwarranted libel suits by the adverse parties. The opinion indicates that
even a known false or malicious statement in these circumstances would be
absolutely privileged.
MONOPOLIES
ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES BY COMBINATIONS OR MONOPOLIES - CONDI-
TIONS PRECEDENT AND DEFENSES - Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).- Plaintiffs, who operated muf-
fler dealerships under sales agreements with one defendant, sought treble
damages for losses sustained because of a conspiracy between all defendants
which violated the antitrust laws. Plaintiffs attacked portions of the sales
agreement as illegal restraints of trade. Defendants, who were awarded
summary judgment in a federal district court, contended that plaintiffs had
voluntarily participated in the violations. A circuit court of appeals affirmed
on the theory that plaintiffs' suit was barred by the doctrine of in pari
delicto. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the doc-
trine was not a valid defense to antitrust actions.
In this case the Court delivered the coup de grace to a doctrine which it
had increasingly avoided. Thus, the Court raised the level of protection
afforded the private antitrust action as a servant of public purpose.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
TORTS - IMMUNITY - Riss v. City of New York, 37 U.S.L.W. 2069
(N.Y. July 2, 1968).- Plaintiff, threatened by a rejected suitor, requested
special police protection. The police refused, and she subsequently sued
the city after being injured by her former suitor. In holding that the city
was not liable for denying special police protection, the court reasoned that
it was not a part of the judicial function to review discretionary executive
decisions involving the deployment of police protection. Although the trend
is towards holding a municipal corporation liable for its torts, the principle
that a city cannot be held liable in the deployment of a limited resource,
police protection, was upheld in this decision.
TORTS - NATURE AND GROUNDS OF LIABrry - City of Lexington v.
Yank, 430 S.W.2d ---- (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).- Plaintiff, a passenger in
an automobile stopped by a Lexington police officer for failing to observe
a traffic signal, made certain comments which incensed the officer who sub-
sequently struck him. This action was brought against the city of Lexington,
alleging the liability of the municipality for the tortious acts of its police
officer. The court, in holding for the plaintiff, reasoned that when the
city separates an individual from the general public and deals with him as
an individual, the same tort rules apply as between: two private individuals.
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In reiterating its abrogation of the municipal immunity doctrine, first
stated in Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965),
the Kentucky Court of Appeals has stayed within the growing minority of
courts which hold this doctrine to be obsolete.
PERSONAL PROPERTY
FINDING LOST GOODS - TITLE - Hurley v. City of Niagara Falls, 30 App.
Div. 2d 89, ____ N.E.2d . , 289 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1968).- Appellant,
hired to build a recreation room in respondents' basement, found $4990 in
bills hidden behind a wooden block. Respondents had been unaware of the
money, but claimed the sum under the common law rule that, although lost
property found in public places belongs to the finder if the true owner is
not located, items found on private premises belong to the owner of the
land. Holding for appellant-finder, the court stated that artide 7-B of the
New York Personal Property Law, N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW, §§ 251-58
(McKinney 1962), was intended to abolish all common law distinctions
concerning lost property, including the public place/private place distinc-
tion.
The decision is an enlightened step toward deansing personal property
law of outdated distinctions based on legal fictions - distinctions which
still survive in most jurisdictions.
PROCEDURE
JOINDER - ACTIONS FOR TORT - Ryan v. Mackolin, 14 Ohio St. 2d 213,
237 N.E.2d 377 (1968).- Plaintiff suffered a back injury from a rear-
end collision. Five months later the injury was complicated by a second
collision. Under OHIO REv. CODE § 2307.191, which parallels rule 20(a)
of the FED. R. Civ. P., plaintiff attempted joinder of defendants, arguing that
the two collisions constituted a "series of occurrences." The Ohio Supreme
Court held that joinder was proper. This is a case of first impression in
Ohio due to the changes in procedure since the enactment of section
2307.191. The court's holding follows the trend toward liberal construction
of rule 20(a) in the federal courts permitting joinder in tort actions to
eliminate multiple litigation.
SECURITIES
BROKER-DEALER - LIABILITY FOR CHURNING INVESTMENT ACCOUNT -
Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. fJ 92,257 (D.
C. Va. Aug. 6, 1968).- Plaintiff brought an action for damages under rule
10b-5 of the Security Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1964),
charging that defendant-broker's churning of her investment account over
a 6-year period resulted in a substantial reduction in the value of her port-
folio. Plaintiff sought to recover the capital gains tax she had paid,
plus the commissions paid to broker, as well as the loss of her portfolio's
market value. In holding the defendant liable, the district court included
as damages recovery for the capital gains tax attributable solely to defend-
ant's fraudulent conduct, as well as the traditional damage measure of the
broker's commission.
The majority rule of limiting churning damages to the broker's profit
was developed in cases involving trading accounts in which the courts
theorized that the loss of market value was an assumed risk. While this
court's novel rule as to damages for churning an investment account expands
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the established rule, it rejects damages for lost value of the portfolio. It
would appear that if churning results in total dissipation of the investment
portfolio, the plaintiff could nevertheless recover only the broker's commis-
sion.
SOCALt SECURITY
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - THE "SUBSTITUTE FATHER ' - King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).- Appellants brought this appeal in order to
determine the validity of Alabama's "Substitute Father" regulation under
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 (1964). This regulation denies
ADC payments to the children of a mother who cohabitates with any single
or able-bodied man. A three-judge panel found the regulation to be incon-
sistent with the act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the regula-
tion was unrelated to need because the actual financial situation of the fam-
ily was irrelevant in determining the existence of a substitute father, and that
Congress intended the word "parent" to include only those persons with a
legal duty of support.
In so holding, the Court acknowledged the intent of Congress, as re-
flected in the 1961, 1962, and 1968 amendments to the act, that immorality
and illegitimacy should be dealt with through rehabilitation and not by
measures which punish the dependent children.
TAXATION
NATURE AND EXTENT OF POWER - NATIONAL BANKS - First Agricul-
tural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'r, 392 U.S. 339 (1968).- Respondent
bank brought suit against the State Tax Commissioner of Massachusetts for
dedaratory relief from the state's recently enacted sales and use tax. In
holding that the bank is not exempt from the tax under the statute, the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the state's contention that the
taxes were applicable to the bank's purchases of tangible personal property
for its own use. The Supreme Court, in reversing, held that a state may not
tax a national bank unless authorized to do so by Congress.
Although the dissent made a forceful argument that with the advent of
the Federal Reserve System the national banks are no longer federal instru-
mentalities and therefore not immune from state taxation, the holding of
the majority followed the proposition firmly established by former Supreme
Court decisions that without congressional action to the contrary, national
banks are immune from state taxation.
TORTS
CONTRACTORS - LIABILITY AFTER COMPLETION AND ACCEPTANCE OF
WoRK - Totten v. Gruzen, 52 N.J. 202, 245 A.2d 1 (1968).-
Plaintiff, an infant, was burned by an exposed radiator pipe in his parents'
apartment. Although plaintiff's parents had lived in the apartment for a
number of years, they had not complained about the pipe. Predicating liabil-
ity in negligence, the court found that the plaintiff's petition stated a cause
of action against the contractor who had installed the heating sysem. The
"patent/latent" distinction as to the obviousness of a danger was relegated
to a consideration on the issue of the contractor's negligence, and was not
treated as a definitive rule of law.
The liability of contractors, once sheltered by the concept of privity, is
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approaching the strictness of products' liability of manufacturers. This de-
cision, following the present trend of the law, extends the tort liability of
the building contractor.
WILLS
CONSTRUCTION - INTENTION OF TESTATOR - First Nat'l Bank v.
Gaines, 15 Ohio Misc. 109 (P. Ct. 1967).- Testator's will provided that
10 years after the death of his wife, the trustee shall convert the estate into
cash and distribute the proceeds to certain named persons or, if they be de-
ceased, to their issue. Testator's wife died in 1965, and the heirs apparent
of the estate petitioned plaintiff, trustee, for a distribution of the assets in
excess of those necessary to administer the estate until 1975. In finding
that the heirs apparent had no present right to distribution, the court held
that the general rule of construction favoring an early vesting of estates must
be subrogated to the testator's dearly expressed intention that the estate shall
not vest for a specified term of years. The decision is consistent with past
Ohio decisions as well as with the results reached in virtual unanimity in
other jurisdictions.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL - APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS TO
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS - Young & Co. v. Shea, 397 F.2d 185
(5th Cir. 1968).- Plaintiff, a dockworker, sued the owner of the ship on
which he was working for injuries received on the job. The shipowner iam-
pleaded plaintiff's employer as a third party defendant. Concluding that
plaintiff sustained no injury, the jury held for the defendants. Subsequent-
ly, plaintiff instituted proceedings under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 55 901-50 (1964). His employer's
motion to dismiss the claim on the grounds of collateral estoppel was denied
by the hearings commissioner. Affirming the commissioner's decision, the
fifth circuit held that the lower standard of proof in compensation proceed-
ings made it easier to establish a claim there than in court and that a work-
man's failure to convince a jury should not preclude him from attempting to
convince a commissioner.
This case of first impression applies to administrative proceedings a prin-
ciple familiar in criminal-civil cases - that the party with the burden of
proof is not estopped to raise in a civil proceeding an issue it lost in a
criminal case, because of the lesser standard of proof in civil matters.
